Labor market imperfections, real wage rigidities and financial shocks by Acocella, Nicola et al.
 Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161 Roma (RM) 
T (+39) 06 49766433  F (+39) 06 4957606 
www.memotef.uniroma1.it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LABOR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, 
REAL WAGE RIGIDITIES AND  
FINANCIAL SHOCKS 
 
 
N. Acocella, L. Bisio,  
G. Di Bartolomeo, A. Pelloni 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper n° 80 
  Marzo 2011 
Labor market imperfections, real wage rigidities
and nancial shocks
Nicola Acocella
Sapienza University of Rome
Laura Bisio
Sapienza University of Rome
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
University of Teramo
Alessandra Pelloni
University of Rome Tor Vergata
March, 2011
Abstract
By using the recent Gertler and Kiyotakis (2010) setup, this paper
explores the interaction between real distortions stemming from the labor
market institutions and nancial shocks. We nd that neither labor mar-
ket imperfections nor scal institutions determining tax wedges have an
impact on the volatility of the real economy induced by a nancial shock.
By contrast, real wage rigidities matter as they amplify the nancial shock
e¤ects. Thus, economies with larger imperfections will not systematically
observe larger or smaller recessions, unless a causality between imperfec-
tions and real wage rigidities is introduced.
Jel codes: E32, E44.
Keywords: Financial accelerator, credit frictions, wage-setters, busi-
ness cycle, volatility.
1 Introduction
The recent crisis has been considered by most economists to be the worst -
nancial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Not surprisingly the
event has stimulated important debates in policy and academic arenas. One of
the specic issues tackled is the interaction between nancial shocks and labor
market institutions.
Costain et al. (2010), Darius et al. (2010), Guichard and Rusticelli (2010)
and Schulze-Cleven and Farrell (2010) e.g. discuss some mixed evidence con-
cerning the fact that economies characterized by more competitive labor markets
We thank Giuseppe Bertola, Stephan Fahr, Daniele Terlizzese and participants at the 7th
ECB/CEPR Labour Market Workshop (Frankfurt, 2010) and at XIX International Conference
on Banking and Finance (University of Rome Tor Vergata, 2010) for useful comments on
previous drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.
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seem to have su¤ered more in terms of unemployment after the recent nancial
crunch. Bentolila et al. (2009) point out that the main root of the di¤erent
performance of France and Spain1 can be found in the di¤erent labor mar-
ket structures in the two countries.2 Their argument is simple. Quantitative
rigidities (e.g., hiring and ring costs) reduce unemployment volatility, as they
prevent adjustments by varying employment. Comparing Spain to France, in
the former there is a larger gap between the dismissal costs of workers with
permanent and temporary contracts.3
OECD data indeed broadly support the idea that economies with imper-
fect labor markets have been hit less by the crisis. Spain, Ireland and United
States are experiencing high increases in their unemployment rates, whereas
Germany, France and Italy are su¤ering less. It seems therefore important to
go beyond anecdotal evidence and analyse the potential interactions between
labor markets and nancial shocks by means of a formal model taking account
of the nancial transmission mechanism. Understanding phenomena such as
the recent nancial crisis and the subsequent policy responses in fact "requires
the use of a macroeconomic framework in which nancial intermediation mat-
ters for the allocation of resources." (Woodford, 2010: 21). Our aim is thus to
explore the interaction between real distortions stemming from the labor market
institutions and nancial shocks in a formal setup explicitly designed to model
nancial disturbances.
An appropriate framework to study the nancial shock transmission mech-
anisms has been recently developed by Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010), as an extension of the original modeling of the nancial ac-
celerator based on the cyclical variations of the value of collaterals, by Bernanke
et al.(1996).4 Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) show
that if, due to an agency problem between bankers and depositors, bankers are
constrained in the amount of credit they can provide to investing rms, distur-
bances to the quality of capital induce a credit drop and a signicant downturn
in economic activity by creating capital losses in the nancial sector.
By using a simplied version of the above framework, we analyze the pos-
sible interactions between nancial shocks and labor market institutions. In
particular, our focus is on real factors, in particular we consider the potential
role of labor market imperfections and real wage rigidities. The former derive
from all those factors having an inuence on the size of the labor wedgeand
1Unemployment rate dramatically rose from 8% in 2007 to 20% in 2009 in Spain, whereas
it rose only slightly in France.
2However, they also stress the role of other factors, e.g. the di¤erent housing markets.
3Wasmer and Weil (2004) and Hristov (2008) nd complementarity between nancial
shocks and labor maker institutions. See also Acemoglu (2001) and Pagano and Pica (2010)
for a more general picture.
4Bernanke et al. (1996) rst introduced a formal model of nancial accelerator in a dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium model with consumers-lenders and rms-borrowers and
no nancial intermediation. A bank channelwas not added until the eruption of the crisis,
when a new wave of models of economies with nancial frictions emerged (see Goodfriend and
Mac Callum, 2007; Angeloni and Faia, 2009; Cùrdia and Woodford, 2009; Dib, 2009; Gertler
and Kiyotaki, 2010; Christiano et al., 2010; Gerali et al., 2010; Iacoviello, 2010; Meh and
Moran, 2010).
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thus impinging on the steady state of the economy. In more detail, we assume
monopolistic competition in the labor market and potentially strategic non-
atomistic wage-setters, who may coordinate their decisions. The labor wedge
depends on these institutions and also on the tax wedge.5 Real wage rigidities
instead have to do with factors having an impact on the pattern of adjustment
over time of real wages after the economy is hit by stochastic disturbances, e.g.
bargaining system regulations, hiring and ring costs, or wage contract dura-
tion, rules presiding over the possibility to revise the wage rate in the face of
unexpected circumstances.6
In a nutshell, we nd that only institutions a¤ecting real wage rigidities mat-
ter, as only these amplify the reaction of the economy to nancial instability. By
contrast, unionization, scal structure, union coordination and monopoly power
have no e¤ect on the nancial crisis dynamics. A sort of neutrality of these
labor market imperfections as regards the reaction of the economy to nancial
disturbances thus emerges, but real wage rigidities interact with nancial fric-
tions amplifying the e¤ects of nancial shocks. Therefore, in the debate on the
e¤ect of labor markets on nancial shocks, it is important to distinguish between
the di¤erent institutions and, in particular, to detect their inuence on the real
wage adjustment mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model.
Section 3 provides some numerical simulations to describe our main results
and provides their intuition. Specically, we rst show our result of neutrality
for the labor market imperfections with respect to the nancial-shock-driven
uctuations and then we investigate the impact of real wage rigidities. A nal
section concludes.
2 The model
Our core framework is a real business cycle model with distorted labor and -
nancial markets and real wage rigidities, based on Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
We consider a simple setup assuming no idiosyncratic uncertainty for producing
rms and homogeneous nancial intermediaries.7 Households consist of both
workers and bankers and perfect consumption insurance among them is guaran-
5The importance of the labor wedge from either a long run or a business cycle perspective
has been highlighted by many authors. See, among others, Hall (1997), Cole et al. (2002),
Mulligan (1998, 2002), Prescott (2004), Galì et al. (2007), Chari et al. (2007), Acocella et al.
(2008) and Shimer (2009). Full discussion is beyond the scope of the present paper.
6See Layard et al. (1991) and Belot and Van Ours (2001) for a more detailed discussion
about imperfections, real rigidities and labor market institutions. Regarding their relevance,
in particular for Europe, see ECB (2009) and references therein. Among others, Du Caju et
al. (2008), Christo¤el et al. (2009), Rumler and Scharler (2009), Abbritti and Weber (2010),
Knell (2010), Guichard and Rusticelli (2010).
7This setup developed by Gertler and Karadi (2009) mimics a frictionless interbank market
with idiosyncratic shocks, as in the Lucas island model (see Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010).
Results can be easily extended to the case of interbank frictions. However, Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) shows that this extension will only have quantitative e¤ects with respect
to the frictionless case (or homogeneous case).
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teed. We consider a non-competitive labor market with strategic wage setters
and real wage rigidities. In this market, workers supply hours to non-nancial
rms and return wages to the household. Similarly, bankers transfer prots
earned from the nancial activity back to their family. Homogeneous banks
intermediate funds between households and non-nancial rms in the nancial
market,8 facing endogenously determined balance sheet constraints due to an
agency problem. Banks provide funds against future prots of the rms which
are able to o¤er perfect state contingent debt. Thus we can think of the banks
claims as equities.9 Competitive non-nancial rms produce output by means
of capital and labor. Finally, competitive capital producing rms owned by the
households are also introduced.
2.1 Households
In the economy there is a continuum of innitely lived households indexed by
i on the unit interval (0; 1); each of them supplies a di¤erentiated labor type.
Preferences of households are dened over consumption (Ct;i) and hours worked
(Lt;i):
E0
1X
t=0
tU (Ct;i; Lt;i) = E0
1X
t=0
t[ln(Ct;i   hCt 1;i)  
1 + "
L1+"t;i ] (1)
with  2 (0; 1). h is the habits in consumption parameter,  measures the
relative weight of the labor argument and " is the inverse Frisch elasticity of
labor supply.
The household budget constraint at time t is:
Ct;i = (1  L)Wt;iLt;i +t;i +RtDt 1;i  Dt;i   Tt (2)
where Dt 1;i is the total quantity of short term debt the household acquires
from banks or government in the form of real bonds that pay the gross real
return Rt over the period from t   1 to t; Wt;i is the real wage, t;i is the
net payout to the household from ownership of both non-nancial and nancial
rms;10 Tt is a lump sum tax; L indicates the labor income tax rate.
Households rst order conditions imply a standard Euler condition:11
1 = Et
UCt+1
UCt
Rt+1 (3)
where UC is the marginal utility of consumption which is dened as follows:
UCt  1
Ct   hCt 1  
h
Ct+1   hCt
8Households can lend money to the banks or fund the government debt. Both deposits
and government debts are one period riskless nancial activities, i.e. perfect substitutes. This
implies that credit rationing only a¤ects banks in collecting deposits, as household can lend
to them or the government.
9 In other words bank loans have the same value as rmsequities.
10Note that t;i is net of the transfer the household gives to its members that enter banking
at time t.
11 Index i is dropped for simplicity.
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Thus, t;t+1 = 
UCt+1
UCt
is the households discount factor. The condition
about the optimal labor supply will be introduced at a later stage, when we
consider the labor market.
2.2 The Real Sector
2.2.1 Final good producing rms
The economy is populated by a continuum of symmetric competitive good pro-
ducing rms indexed by f on the unit interval (0; 1); they employ both capital
(Kt 1) and labor (Lt) as inputs. Each rm produces perfectly substitutable
goods given a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt;f = AtK

t 1;fLt;f
1  (4)
where At = exp (at) is an aggregate productivity shock, with at = a at 1 + ut;
and ut a i:i:d: normal variable and Lt;f denotes a labor bundle of imperfect
substitutable labor types distributed over a unit interval, represented by:
Lt;f =
Z 1
0
L (i)
 1

t;f di
 
 1
(5)
where  is a measure of the wage setters monopoly power (i.e., the intra-
temporal elasticity of substitution across di¤erent labor inputs).
For any given level of its labor demand, Lt;f , each rm must decide the
optimal allocation across labor inputs, subject to the aggregation technology
(5). From the minimization cost problem solution, demand for labor type i by
rm f is then:
L(i)t;f =

(1 + S)Wt (i)
Wt
 
Lt;f (6)
where S is the payroll tax rate and
Wt =
Z 1
0
Wt (i)
1 
di
 1
1 
(7)
is the average real wage index.
Firms equate the marginal productivity of labor to the wage. As rms are
symmetric we can just drop the index f and obtain aggregate labor demand:
Lt =

(1 + S)Wt
AtKt 1 (1  )
  1
(8)
or
Wt =
1  
1 + S
Yt
Lt
(9)
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As far as capital services demand is concerned, we observe that the gross
prot per unit of capital Zt is given by:
Zt =
Yt  WtLt
Kt
= At

Lt
Kt
1 
: (10)
Firms are nanced by banks, who collect the savings of households. Firms
buy new capital goods from capital producers by issuing state-contingent equi-
ties at price Qt and committing to pay the ow of future gross capital prots
to the banks.
2.2.2 Capital producing rms
There is a continuum of length one of competitive capital producing rms.12
They transform one unit of nal good into one unit of capital good (priced
Qt) subject to a ow adjustment cost. Thus, the representative capital produc-
ing rm maximizes the following expected present discounted value of future
prots:13
Et
1X
t=0
t;t+1

(Qt   1) It   f

It
It 1

It

where It is the production (i.e., investment) and f (:) is the adjustment cost
function. We assume that f(1) = f 0(1) = 0 and f 00 (It=It 1) > 0; f (It=It 1) It
is physical adjustment costs.
Prot maximization implies:
Qt = 1 + f

It
It 1

+
It
It 1
f 0

It
It 1

  Ett;t+1f 0

It+1
It

It+1
It
2
(11)
The law of motion for capital is given by:
Kt+1 = 	t+1 (It +Kt (1  )) (12)
where  is the capital depreciation rate and 	t = exp ( t) is a capital qual-
ity shock, i.e., an exogenous source of variation in the value of capital;  t =
  t 1+"t and "t is a i:i:d: normal variable with zero mean and nite variance,
2.14
2.2.3 Labor markets
Di¤erently from Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), the labor market is not competi-
tive as each worker sells a di¤erent kind of labor. Each wage-setter bargains over
the real wage, taking other workersdecisions as given. However, wage setting
12Firmsindices are dropped for simplicity.
13Capital producing rms earn no prots in steady state; when uctuations occur they
redistribute prots directly to the households who own capital producing rms.
14See Gertler and Karadi (2009), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2009) and Gourio (2009) for
this kind of shock.
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might be coordinated to various degrees.15 The coordination degree is captured
by the parameter n 1 in the following way. Each wage-setter (indexed by j,
with j = 1; :::n) acts on behalf of a length n 1 of workers. More specically,
each union j set the wage Wt;j of the agent i 2 j, (i.e., Wt;i = Wt;j if i 2 j) so
as to maximize his utility in (1), subject to the budget constraint (2), (6) and
(8).
In fact, by (7), in the decentralized equilibrium each union j anticipates that
@Wt
@Wt;j
=
@
@Wt;j
Z
i2j
Wt(i)
1 di+
Z
i=2j
Wt(i)
1 di
 1
1 
= (13)
1
n

Wt;j
Wt
 
At the symmetric equilibrium,16 the wage-settersrst order conditions yield:
0 = Et

1
Ct;i   hCt 1;i  
h
Ct+1;i   hCt;i
 
(   1) (n  1) + 1  


+
   (1  L)L
"
t
Wt

 (n  1) + 1


(14)
This implies that labor supply is
W t =  Et
ULt
UCt
1
1  L (15)
where  = 1+(n 1)1 [1 ( 1)(n 1)] denotes the gross wage markup. Observe that
our formulation nests alternative labor market regimes, ranging from perfect
competition (n,  ! 1,  = 1) to monopolistic competition (n ! 1, 1 <  <
1,  =  (   1) 1), to strategic wage setting (1  n <1; 1 <  <1).
Following Blanchard and Galì (2007) and Christo¤el and Linzert (2010),
we assume that real wages respond sluggishly to labor market conditions in
a parsimonious way. Specically, we assume the following partial adjustment
model17 :
Wt = (Wt 1)

(W t )
 1 (16)
where  is an index of real rigidities.
15See, e.g., Gnocchi (2009) for a similar framework. See also Lippi (2003).
16We restrict attention to symmetric equilibria where all wage-setters claim the same real
wage.
17Note that equation (16) is compatible with di¤erent theoretical specications of the la-
bor market. Thus, it permits us to consider the e¤ects real wage rigidities from a general
perspective, i.e., abstracting from their roots. On the di¤erent sources of real wage rigidities
(including right-to-manage, social norms, matching models) see, among others, Blanchard and
Katz (1999), Christo¤ell et al. (2006, 2009), Hall (2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Christo¤el
and Linzert (2010).
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The labor market clearing condition comes from the labor demand (9) and
supply (16), which is subject to a partial adjustment process, unless  = 0.
Because of the labor market imperfections, in the steady state the ratio between
the marginal rate of substitution ( UL=UC) and the marginal product of labor
(MPL) will be di¤erent from one, i.e. a labor wedge # will arise:
MPL=  #Et UL
UC
(17)
where #   1+S1 L . This wedge is an increasing function of  and n18 (i.e., the
elasticity of substitution of wage-setterscoordination) and of the tax rates (S
and L). In other words, the labor wedge reects, on the one hand, technology,
labor market institutions and the productive structure of a country and, on the
other hand, the taxation and social security system. In our setup, an increase
in the gross wage markup or in the tax wedge raises the cost of labor (and real
wages) and, coeteris paribus, lowers employment.19
The parameter # is thus a measure of the (permanent) labor market imper-
fections, whereas  measures the (temporary) rigidities in the wage adjustment
process.
2.2.4 Aggregate resource constraint
The economy-wide resource constraint is:
Ct = Yt   It
"
1 +

2

It
It 1
  1
2#
  Yt g (18)
where g is a xed fraction of income which the government spends nancing the
expenditure by taxation without any recourse to debt.
2.3 The nancial sector
As mentioned above, the representation of the nancial sector is borrowed from
Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Banks are owned
by households. Each period a fraction  of bankers survives while a fraction
1    exits and is replaced.20 Each bankers objective is then to maximize the
expected discounted present value of its future ows of net worth nt, that is:
Vt = Et
1X
i=1
(1  )i 1t;t+int+i (19)
18For reasonable values of  and .
19Of course, our simplied model does not capture all relevant channels. For instance,
the ultimate e¤ects of tax wedges on employment cannot be unambiguously inferred without
considering that the labor taxes might be used to nance policies that foster labor supply.
20New bankers are endowed with a fraction =(1 ) of the value of the assets intermediated
by the existing bankers. Indeed, there are di¤erent ways to model bankers turnover. See
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010: 10) for a discussion.
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Bankers can loan the sum of the bank net worth nt and deposits dt to rms
or can divert a fraction  of this sum to their family. Diverting assets can be
protable for the banker who, afterwards, would default on his debt and shut
down, and correspondingly represents a loss for creditors who, at most, could
reclaim the fraction 1   of assets. As a consequence, depositors would restrict
their credit to the banks as they realize that the following incentive constraint
must hold for the banks in order to prevent them from diverting funds:
Vt(st; dt) >  (nt + dt) (20)
i.e., the value of the bank must always be greater than the amount the banks
can divert.
Each period, the value of loans funded, Qt st; must equal the sum of the
bank net worth nt and deposits dt:
Qt st = nt + dt (21)
where st is the volume of loans funded. Recall that the banks loans can be
interpreted as rmsequities owned by the bank.
The net worth for the single bank evolves according to:
nt = 	t[Zt + (1  ) Qt]st 1  Rtdt 1 (22)
where Zt is the dividend payment at t on the loans the bank funded at time
t   1. It is worth noticing that 	t a¤ects the value of the capital of the non
nancial rms and, in turn, the value of the equities held by the bank.
The solution of the above dynamic optimization problem implies21
Qt st = tnt (23)
as
t 
vst
Qt
  vt > 0 (24)
t =
vt
   t
(25)
where t is the leverage ratio of the bank; vst is the marginal value of assets for
the banks; and vt is the marginal value of deposits to the bank at time t.
As banks are constrained on the retail deposit market, there will be a positive
di¤erence between the marginal value and cost of loans for the banks. Moreover,
the marginal value of net worth 
t and the gross rate of return on bank assets
Rkt must obey the following conditions:
vt = Et t;t+1
t+1Rt+1 (26)
t = Et t;t+1
t+1(Rkt+1  Rt+1) (27)
21See Appendix A for details on the derivation.
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with22

t+1 = 1   + (vt+1 + t+1t+1) (28)
Rkt+1 = 	t+1
Zt+1 + (1  )Qt+1
Qt
(29)
It follows that there will always be an excess return of assets over deposits:
Et t;t+1
t+1Rkt+1 > Et t;t+1
t+1Rt+1 (30)
Aggregating (23) over all banks,23 we obtain the sector balance sheet and
the demand for assets from the banks:
Qt St = Nt +Dt (31)
Qt St = tNt (32)
The overall bank lending capacity depends on the aggregate bank capital which,
in turn, may be a¤ected by the changing value of the funded assets.
The aggregate net worth (Nt) evolves according to
Nt = ( + )	t[Zt + (1  ) Qt]St 1   RtDt 1 (33)
The above expression is determined by a double aggregation. We compute
the aggregate net worth of new and old bankers using (22) twice and then we
sum them up. In detail, we know that the new individual bankers are endowed
with a fraction =(1  ) of the value of the asset intermediated by the exiting
bankers (i.e., (1  ) [Zt + (1  ) Qt]St 1) while the surviving bankers net
worth is equal to [Zt + (1  ) Qt]St 1:
Finally, the securities markets clear when (St = Kt+1):
St = It + (1  )Kt (34)
This completes the description of the set-up of the model.
22The term t;t+1
t+1 can be thought of as the augmented stochastic discount factor since
it accounts for the stochastic marginal value of the net worth (
t+1).
23Aggregate values for nancial assets are indicated by capital letters.
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2.4 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of plans fCt, Lt, It, Kt, Qt, Zt, Rkt, Rt, Nt,
Wt, Dt, St, vt, 
t, t, tg satisfying the following conditions derived above:24
1 = Et
UCt+1
UCt
Rt+1 (35)
Lt =

(1 + S)Wt
AtKt 1 (1  )
  1
(36)
Zt = At

Lt
Kt
1 
(37)
Qt   1 = f

It
It 1

+
It
It 1
f 0

It
It 1

  Ett;t+1f 0

It+1
It

It+1
It
2
(38)
Kt+1 = 	t+1 (It +Kt (1  )) (39)
Wt = (Wt 1)


 Et ULt
UCt
1
1  L
 1
(40)
Ct = AtK

t 1Lt
1  (1  g)  It
"
1 +

2

It
It 1
  1
2#
(41)
t =
vt
   t
(42)
vt = Et t;t+1
t+1Rt+1 (43)
t = Et t;t+1
t+1(Rkt+1  Rt+1) (44)

t+1 = 1   + (vt+1 + t+1t+1) (45)
Rkt+1 = 	t+1
Zt+1 + (1  )Qt+1
Qt
(46)
Qt St = Nt +Dt (47)
t =
Qt St
Nt
(48)
Nt = ( + )	t[Zt + (1  ) Qt]St 1   RtDt 1 (49)
St = It + (1  )Kt (50)
given the exogenous process f	tg and the economy initial conditions for the
endogenous state variables.
24Note that (41) is obtained aggregating (4) and substituting it into (18); equation derives
from (9) and (16); vst can be obtained from (24); UCt and t;t+1 have been already dened
and f (:) will be specied in the next section.
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3 Financial shocks and labor rigidities
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency. The discount factor is set
at a value consistent with a real interest rate of 4% per year. We set the
inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity (") to 2 and the parameter  of the utility
function so that households devote about one third of their time to paid work
in the deterministic steady state, normalizing to one the total time. The habits
parameter is 0:5.25 The depreciation rate () is 0:025 and the capital share ()
is 0:33. We assume that the adjustment cost is
f

It
It 1

=

2

It
It 1
  1
2
and use a calibration in line with Altig et al. (2011).26
In the labor market, as benchmark we set the intra-temporal elasticity of
substitution across labor inputs to 6, corresponding to a wage markup of 20%.
In the baseline case, we consider a small degree of workers coordination in
setting their actions (i.e., they behave closely to atomistic wage-setters) by set-
ting 1=n = 0:33. The corresponding wage markup is 1:25. We also consider a
small tax wedge by setting it to 1:20.27 We do not report the index of real wage
rigidities () as di¤erent calibrations will be considered. Specically, in the next
subsection, we only focus on labor market imperfections and assume real wages
adjust immediately ( = 0). In the next subsection instead we focus on real
rigidities by using the baseline calibration under di¤erent assumption about ,
ranging 0 from to 0:7.
Regarding the nancial sector, we calibrate  to obtain an average banks
survival period of ten years;  and  to meet an economy-wide leverage ratio of
about four and an average credit spread of one hundred basis points per year.28
We nally assume that in the steady state government consumption represents
20% of value added. Besides, our baseline model allows for perfectly exible real
wages; we analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent levels of rigidities in a separate section.
The values we assign to the structural parameters in the baseline calibration
of the model are summarized in Table 1.
25As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Christiano et al. (2005) consider 0:65.
26Results are robust with respect to di¤erent calibrations. Elasticity of investment to the
price of capital (1=) usually ranges between 0:1-0:6. Further simulations are available upon
request.
27Alternative choices will be later discussed.
28See Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) for a discussion.
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 0.99 Discount rate
" 0.5 Inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity
 5.584 Relative utility weight of labor
h 0.5 Habits parameter
 0.33 E¤ective Capital share
 0.025 Depreciation rate
1= 0.4 Elasticity of investment to the price of capital
 6 Elasticity of substitution across labor inputs
1=n 0.33 Union density
1+S
1 L 1.2 Tax wedge
 0.39 Fraction of divertable assets
 0.972 Survival rate of bankers

1  0.107 Transfer to new entering bankers
g 0.2 Steady state government consumption
 0.66 Persistence of the capital quality shock
Table 1 Baseline parameter values
3.2 Labor market imperfections
In order to isolate real wage rigidities from labor market imperfections in this
section we set  = 0, i.e. we assume no partial adjustment for real wages.
Equilibrium in the labor market is then given by the following equation:
(1  ) AtKt 1Lt  = #L"tEt

1
Ct   hCt 1  
h
Ct+1   hCt

(51)
By using (51) we consider three di¤erent scenarios: the competitive wages
case; our baseline calibration; an economy with larger imperfections where we
set  = 4:4 (the resulting markup is 1:35).29 It is worth noticing that in all
scenarios we consider tax distortions as the tax wedge is set according to our
baseline calibration.
Figure 1 displays the impulse response functions30 to a negative capital qual-
ity shock in the three scenarios.
29Recall that the markup is also inuenced by the wage-setter coordination.
30The gure displays per cent deviations from the steady state. Output response is com-
puted from the production function, after aggregation.
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Figure 1 - Financial shock and labor market imperfections
The dynamics is of the kind described by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The
nancial shock triggers a nancial accelerator31 that implies a fall in the in-
vestment activity as well as in the other real variables because of the reduction
in the value of the net worth of banks (which entails a rise in the external -
nance premium) and thus in their capacity of collecting deposits. The fall in
investment and the disruption of nancial intermediation lead to a fall in labor
demand and a consequent fall in output and consumption.
Concerning the labor market imperfections the result is clear. The dynamics
of the model is independent of the degree of imperfections in the labor market.32
A sort of neutrality of the labor market institutions with respect to the propa-
gation in the economy of nancial disturbances arises.
What emerges is that the e¤ect of the nancial shock is robust to changes
in the degree of labor market imperfections, i.e. in the level of the labor wedge.
Since the labor wedge results from the combination of various factors like the
elasticity of substitution among labor kinds (), the degree of interaction among
31Di¤erently from the frictionless case that is not reported. See Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
32Although the three scenarios exhibit the same dynamics, the e¤ects at the levels are
di¤erent. Specically, the economy with more imperfections will be characterized by lower
levels of capital and labor at the steady state and thus will su¤er less the nancial shock at
the levels.
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wage setters (n) and the tax rates (S and L), we can meaningfully point
out that the e¤ects of a nancial shock are robust to the variations of these
institutional factors and labor market features.
The neutrality result concerning the role played by di¤erent degrees of labor
market imperfections in shaping the consequences of a nancial shock in our
economy may have relevant policy implications. In fact, contrary to some anec-
dotal evidence, according to our simulations, the institutional factors a¤ecting
the labor wedge do not alter the channels of transmission of nancial frictions
to the real economy.
3.3 Real wage rigidities
The above neutrality results is robust with respect to wage rigidities: if we
set  between zero and one, di¤erent degrees of labor market imperfections
(either in the markup or the tax wedge) do not a¤ect nancial-shock-driven
uctuations.33 On the other hand, di¤erent degrees of wage rigidities clearly
lead to di¤erent dynamics of real variables, as a change in  a¤ects the dynamics,
but independently of the degree of labor market imperfections.
Figure 2 describes the impulse responses triggered by a negative nancial
shock in our economy under di¤erent degrees of real wage rigidities. In simu-
lations, we use our baseline calibration34 and consider: perfectly exible wages
( = 0); an intermediate level of real wage rigidity ( = 0:4); and an economy
with a very slow adjustment process for real wages ( = 0:7).
33Further simulations are available upon request.
34However, the gure is robust with respect to a change in the wage markup or in the
tax wedge, because, as already said, labor market imperfections are neutral with respect to
nancial shock dynamics.
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Figure 2 - Financial shock and real wage rigidities
All the variables react to the shock exactly as described in the previous section
because the mechanism at work is the same, but the clear-cut result reported in
Figure 2 is that, di¤erently from other labor market imperfections, real wage
rigidities amplify the e¤ects of the nancial crisis.
As might be expected, because of the partial adjustment of real wages, larger
rigidities are associated with both deeper uctuations and slower recoveries of
the variables with respect to their steady state path.35 However, larger rigidities
also interact with nancial frictions by a¤ecting the net worth of the banks, thus
further worsening the reaction of the economy to a nancial shock. The result
can be intuitively explained as follows: when the quality of capital worsens, the
marginal productivity of labour decreases, if the real wage is not free to fall in
parallel to this, employment and therefore the productivity of capital fall more
than if the real wage is exible. The e¤ect is a marked reduction in the return of
capital which further worsens the banksbalance sheets, leading to a deepening
of the credit contraction.
35 It is worth noticing that larger welfare losses are associated to larger uctuations (see, for
a discussion, Gertler and Karadi, 2009; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010).
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4 Conclusions
By using the recent Gertler and Kiyotakis (2010) setup, this paper has ex-
plored the interaction between distortions in labor market institutions and the
nancial sector. We found that neither labor market imperfections (in terms
of monopoly power or strategic interactions among wage setters) nor scal in-
stitutions determining tax wedges have an impact on the volatility of the real
economy induced by a nancial shock. Instead, real wage rigidities matter, as
they amplify the e¤ects of nancial imperfections.
Our results have serious implications for the policy debate about the role of
labor markets in amplifying or dampening the current nancial crisis. Ampli-
cations of nancial shocks are related only to those features of the institutional
setting that a¤ect the dynamic adjustment process of wages. Economies with
larger imperfections in labour markets will not systematically observe larger or
smaller recessions, unless a positive correlation between those imperfections and
real wage rigidities is introduced.36
This implies that one should carefully detect the di¤erent features of labour
markets in order to predict the likely e¤ects of nancial frictions on volatility.
Appendix A Financial sector appendix
A1 Bankers maximization problem
The objective of the bank at the end of period t   1 is the expected present
value of future dividends, as follows:
Vt 1(st 1; dt 1) = Et 1
1X
i=1
(1  )i 1t;t 1+int 1+i (52)
Given the (sequence of) balance sheets constraints:
Qt 1st 1   nt 1 = dt 1: (53)
we can formulate the following Bellman equation:
Vt 1(st 1; dt 1) = Et 1t 1;tf(1  )nt + [Max
st;dt
Vt(st; dt)]g (54)
The net worth at t, nt, i.e. the gross payo¤ from assets funded at t  1, net
of borrowing costs, evolves according to
nt =  t[Zt + (1  ) Qt]st 1  Rtdt 1: (55)
36However, this does not seem empirically to be the case. For instance, Belgium, Germany
and Italy are characterized by high degrees of union density and coverage as well of tax wedges,
but Germany and Italy, in contrast to Belgium, have a very low wage indexation, which is
one of the factors inuencing real wage exibility (see Du Caju et al., 2008).
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By combining (53) and (55), we can then write:
Qtst   dt = dt 1 =  t[Zt + (1  ) Qt]st 1  Rtdt 1: (56)
Given the incentive constraint stemming from the agency problem:
Vt 1(st 1; dt 1) > Qt 1st 1; (57)
to solve the maximization problem of the banker we dene the Lagrangian L:
L = Et 1t 1;t[((1  ) t[Zt + (1  ) Qt]st 1  Rtdt 1)+
+ fVt(st; dt) + t[Vt(st; dt)  Qtst]g]: (58)
This has to be maximized given the constraint (56).To do so we formulate the
following guess for the value function:
Vt(st; dt) = vstst   vtdt: (59)
The derivative of (58) with respect to dt (of which st is a function, given
(56)) must equal zero, for an interior solution. This gives us, by using (56) to
calculate the derivative of st with respect to dt, the following condition:
Et 1t 1;t

 t   @Vt(st; dt)
@dt
(1 + t)

= 0 (60)
or, assuming (59):
 t + vt (1 + t) = 0 (61)
The constraint (57) can be written, using (59), as vstst   vtdt  Qtst and,
by (by using (53)):
vtnt  Qtst

 + vt   vst
Qt

(62)
so assuming this constraint holds as an equality we deduce: Vt(st; dt) = vstst  
vt (Qtst   nt) = (vst vtQt)vtntQt(+vt  vstQt ) + vtnt. Hence:
Vt(st; dt) = vtnt

t
   t
+ 1

(63)
where t =
vst
Qt
  vt > 0.
If we dene:
t 
vt
   t
(64)
it follows that
Vt(st; dt) = nt (tt + vt) (65)
By substituting the above expression (65) for Vt(st; dt) in (54), we have:
Vt(st; dt) = Ett+1;t

(1  )nt+1 + nt+1
 
t+1t+1 + vt+1

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or
Vt(st; dt) = Ett;t+1
t+1nt+1 (66)
where

t+1 = (1  ) + 
 
t+1t+1 + vt+1

(67)
and using (55):
Vt(st; dt) = Ett;t+1
t+1
 
 t+1[Zt+1 + (1  ) Qt+1]st  Rt+1dt

(68)
So by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients it follows that:
vt = Ett;t+1
t+1Rt+1 (69)
and
vst = Ett;t+1
t+1

 t+1[Zt+1 + (1  ) Qt+1]
	
: (70)
A2 Assets demand
We can rewrite (62), given (24), as:
(   t)Qtst = vtnt (71)
The individual bank total demand for assets Qt st can then be written, using
(24) as:
Qt st = tnt (72)
which, at the aggregate level, turns out to be:
Qt St = tNt (73)
Appendix B Steady state
In the steady state the model is dened by the following two blocks of equations.
Concerning the real part of the economy, from equations (35)-(41), we have:
R =
1

(74)
L =

1 + S
AK (1  )W
  1
(75)
Z = A

L
K
1 
(76)
Q = 1 (77)
I = K (78)
W =
L"
1  L
(1  h)C
1  h (79)
C =
"
(1  g)A

L
K
1 
  
#
K (80)
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Concerning the nancial sector of the economy, from equations (42)-(50), we
have:
 =
v
    (81)
v = 
 (82)
 = 
(Rk   1) (83)

 = 1   + (v + ) (84)
Rk = Z + (1  ) (85)
S = N +D (86)
 = S=N (87)
N = ( + ) [Z + (1  ) ]S   (=)D (88)
S = K (89)
Some cumbersome algebra is then requested to obtain the steady state.
By using equations (83), (82), (81), one obtains:
 =


   
 (Rk   1) (90)
which substituted in (84) yields:

 = 1   + 

   
 (Rk   1) (91)
Combining (74), (85), (86) and (88) gives:
N =
( + )Rk   (=)
1  ( + )Rk D
which solved for D and substituted in (86), given (89), after rearranging yields:
K =

1 +
1  ( + )Rk
( + )Rk   =

N (92)
that combined with (87) and (89) yields:
 = 1 +
1  ( + )Rk
( + )Rk   = (93)
By combining (90) and (93), we get the following expression for Rk:
Rk =

+ (   )
( + ) 

(94)
Equations (91) and (94) are a two equation system in two unknowns, 
 and
Rk. The solution of the system clearly gives the steady state values for these
two variables.
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By substituting (94) into (91), one obtains the following second order poly-
nomial equation in 
:

2 + [(   1)(1  )(1  )]
  (1  ) ( + )  = 0 (95)
whose positive solution is chosen and substituted in (94) to obtain Rk. Once
system (91) and (94) is solved, the steady-state values for , , v are obtained
straightforwardly.
Finally, by combining (79), (75), (80), and using (76) and (85), after cum-
bersome algebra, we get the expression for L only in terms of Rk:
L =
 
(1  L) (1  )
 
Rk 1+


1 
1 
(1 + S)

(1  g) Rk 1+   
! 11+" (96)
Combining (76) and (85), and using the steady-state values for L and Rk,
K is also obtained. Other steady-state values (S, I, C, W , D, N , Z) are then
easily found recursively.
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